By Paolo Falconio * –
This contribution is an integral part of the forthcoming volume “Simulating the Unthinkabl”e, dedicated to the structural fragility of nuclear deterrence.
The book’s analysis is based on data and reports from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), declassified simulations by the RAND Corporation, NATO documentation and studies, as well as peer‑reviewed scientific literature in the field of strategic and international security studies.
The following text is protected under current copyright law. Any reproduction, dissemination, or use, even partial, in any form or by any means, is prohibited without the Author’s explicit written authorization.
Abstract
This article does not assess hypersonic vectors in terms of military superiority, but analyzes their systemic impact on the stability of nuclear deterrence. The argument focuses on three variables: time compression, operational ambiguity, and degradation of the decision‑making process. The central thesis is that these systems do not strengthen deterrence through credibility; rather, they increase instability by reducing the margins for crisis management.
The operational introduction of hypersonic vectors — Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) and Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (HCMs) — represents a strategic discontinuity comparable, in systemic impact, to the introduction of ICBMs in the 1950s.
This article argues that such systems do not reinforce nuclear deterrence but instead heighten its structural fragility. In particular, they compress decision times, amplify strategic ambiguity, and exacerbate the cognitive mechanisms that have historically led to nuclear near‑misses.
By integrating deterrence theory, strategic studies, and escalation simulations, it shows how hypersonic vectors accelerate the transition from “managed” deterrence to inherently unstable deterrence.
Deterrence as a Fragile Socio‑Technical System.
Classical deterrence theory, from Schelling to Aron, presupposes at least three minimal conditions for stability:
– sufficient time for assessment and deliberation
– operational distinguishability between conventional and nuclear attack
– the possibility of communication during a crisis
These conditions were already partially illusory during the Cold War, but remained operationally sustainable thanks to relatively long warning times (20–30 minutes) and a limited number of strategic actors.
Deterrence functioned, therefore, not as a perfect equilibrium but as a fragile socio‑technical system stabilized by time.
Hypersonic vectors simultaneously strike all three conditions, eroding the temporal, informational, and cognitive foundations on which nuclear deterrence has historically been built.
Time Compression and the Collapse of Decision‑Making.From launch‑on‑warning to decide‑under‑ambiguity
To understand the impact of hypersonic vectors, it is essential to distinguish among three dimensions often conflated in public and strategic debate:
– the missile’s flight time
– detection time by warning systems
– decision time, which includes assessment, political consultation, and authorization of force
The discontinuity introduced by hypersonics concerns above all this last dimension.
Ballistic‑type Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) — such as China’s DF‑ZF or Russia’s Avangard — generally remain detectable during the boost phase by early‑warning radars, similar to traditional ballistic missiles.
However, once the gliding vehicle separates, its non‑ballistic trajectory and maneuverability during the glide phase make continuous tracking significantly more complex.
This results in a degradation of the quality of available information: predictions of the final target become less reliable, and operational uncertainty increases precisely during the critical phase of decision‑making.
Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (HCMs) — such as the Zircon — present genuinely later detection windows, due to lower flight profiles and radar‑horizon exploitation.
It is important to clarify, however, that speeds between Mach 5 and Mach 9 do not completely eliminate reaction times compared to supersonic cruise missiles (Mach 2–3).
The discontinuity does not lie in the elimination of remaining physical time, but in the drastic reduction of useful decision time, aggravated by uncertainty regarding route, mission, and warhead type.
In both cases, the central destabilizing factor is not speed per se, but the combination of time compression, operational ambiguity, and loss of reliable tracking.
This produces a structural cognitive collapse: deterrence requires rationality under stress, but real decision systems are affected by systematic biases (loss aversion, anchoring, illusion of control).
When available time falls below a critical threshold, nuclear decision‑making tends to shift from deliberate strategic choice to reflexive reaction.
Deterrence thus ceases to be a relationship mediated by time and becomes an increasingly automated process.
For completeness: these missiles are not invisible, but their ability to change trajectory can make tracking very challenging.
The same applies to interceptability. Extremely high reentry speeds, combined with the capability to alter course or follow low-altitude flight profiles, do not make interception by systems like THAAD or Aegis impossible, but success depends on perfect tracking and extremely high responsiveness.
Hypersonic Ambiguity and the Dissolution of Escalation Thresholds. Dual‑use and operational indistinguishability.
A central element is the conventional–nuclear entanglement.
Hypersonic vectors can carry conventional or nuclear warheads, strike strategic targets (C2, radars, bases), and follow non‑ballistic trajectories.
For the defender, no reliable method exists to distinguish, in time, between a limited conventional strike and a decapitating nuclear first strike.
In this context, strategic ambiguity loses its stabilizing function: when assessment time is shorter than decision time, ambiguity does not deter — it generates panic.
Hypersonic vectors thus dissolve escalation thresholds, turning any attack on strategic assets into a potential nuclear trigger.
HGV Scenario. Timeline of an Avangard Launch (Intercontinental Scenario).
T = 0:00 — Launch
ICBM booster ignition from a ground silo.
Infrared signature immediately detectable by early‑warning satellites.
T = 0:30 – 1:30 — Initial Confirmation
Space‑based systems confirm launch event.
Preliminary estimation of ballistic trajectory begins.
First notifications to command centers.
Actual decision time available: ~25–28 minutes (estimated).
At this stage, the system is indistinguishable from a traditional ICBM.
T = 3:00 – 4:00 — End of Boost Phase
Engine cutoff.
Separation of the Avangard vehicle.
Initial apogee ~100–150 km.
Here the discontinuity begins.
T = 5:00 – 8:00 — Entry into Hypersonic Glide
The vehicle reenters the upper atmosphere.
Maneuvering glide begins (Mach 15–20+ according to Russian sources).
Trajectory no longer purely ballistic.
Prediction quality of the impact point decreases.
With a traditional ICBM, after 5–7 minutes the ballistic trajectory is sufficiently predictable (useful decision time 24–25 minutes).
With Avangard, tracking solutions become less stable.
Useful decision time drops sharply (~15–18 minutes remaining).
T = 10:00 – 18:00 — Maneuver Phase
Possible lateral course changes.
Altitude variations.
Growing ambiguity about the final target.
During this window, the decision‑maker must choose whether to:
– wait for further confirmation
– raise alert status
– prepare a nuclear response
But every minute spent verifying reduces the possibility of a fully coordinated response.
Time remaining: ~8–10 minutes.
T = 20:00 – 23:00 — Terminal Phase
Rapid descent toward target.
Interception extremely difficult.
Last authorization window.
Effective decision time remaining: 10–5 minutes depending on tracking.
T = 25:00 – 30:00 — Impact
Comparison with a Classic ICBM
| Factor | Traditional ICBM | Avangard |
|——-|——————|———-|
| Flight time | 25–30 min | 25–30 min (similar) |
| Predictability | High after boost | Degraded |
| Tracking stability | High | Variable |
| Cognitive pressure | Progressive | Increasing and uncertain |
| Target ambiguity | Limited | High |
Crucial point. Total speed does not change radically.
The difference is this:
– With a classic ICBM, within 5–7 minutes the impact point is estimable with good reliability.
– With Avangard, that estimate may remain unstable until 10–15 minutes before impact.
The result is a compression of certain decision time, not necessarily of physical time.
This marks the shift from:
launch‑on‑warning → decide‑under‑ambiguity
Immediate effect in case of a limited salvo:
Proportional response potentially compromised.
Uncertainty until the last minutes whether it will hit the Nevada desert or Las Vegas.
Trigger: In uncertainty, a retaliatory launch on St. Petersburg; escalation through Russian counterstrike.
HCM Scenario.
Hypothesis: HCM launched from the Kaliningrad area or western Russia against a NATO node in the Baltic States (e.g., C2 structure or air base in Lithuania/Latvia).
Estimated distance: 600–900 km
HCM speed: Mach 6–8
Total flight time: 7–10 minutes
Baltic Scenario Timeline (HCM ~800 km)
T = 0:00 — Launch
No visible boost phase for satellites.
Event initially invisible to space‑based systems.
Dependence on regional ground‑based radars.
T = 1:30 – 2:30 — First Radar Detection
Baltic NATO radars detect high‑speed trace.
Tracking initially unstable.
Classification not immediate (aircraft? Missile? Interference?).
Time remaining: ~5–7 minutes.
T = 3:00 – 4:00 — Probable HCM Classification
Speed > Mach 5.
Profile consistent with hypersonic cruise missile.
Warhead type not distinguishable.
Final target uncertain (possible course changes).
Time remaining: ~4–6 minutes.
T = 4:30 – 5:30 — Strategic‑Level Alert
Notification to SHAPE.
Information to the affected national government.
Information to the Secretary General.
Attempt to activate the North Atlantic Council.
Time remaining: ~3–4 minutes.
T = 6:00 – 7:00 — Terminal Phase
Impact point now clear.
No realistic window for:
– formal NAC meeting
– consultation among capitals
– deliberation on Article 5
Real deliberative window: 0 minutes.
The NAC can only be informed of the imminent impact.
Impact: T = 7–10 minutes
What Does This Mean Systemically?
In this scenario:
– technical time precedes political time
– multilateral consensus is physically impossible before impact
– the response becomes necessarily:
– immediate and national, or
– collective but post‑event
This radically changes the logic of extended deterrence.
Central Point.
NATO is a political machine that operates in accelerated diplomatic time.
But it is not designed to function in timeframes shorter than 10 minutes.
In the Baltic region, an HCM:
– does not merely compress deterrence
– it compresses politics
– bypasses collegiality
– transforms extended deterrence into reactive post‑impact deterrence
Here the thesis becomes even stronger:
It is not the weapon’s destructiveness that destabilizes.
It is its ability to fall below the minimum operating threshold of the decision‑making system.
Multiplier Effect on Escalation Mechanisms.
Escalation simulations indicate that nuclear war does not emerge from a single rational decision, but from a chain of failed micro‑decisions. Hypersonic delivery systems act as:
– error accelerators;
– false‑alarm amplifiers;
– cognitive triggers under extreme stress.
They increase the likelihood that a false positive will be interpreted as a real attack, reduce the possibility of cross‑verification, and incentivize pre‑delegation and automation postures, including the integration of artificial intelligence systems into command‑and‑control processes. And here we should recall that the study of historical near‑misses (Petrov, Able Archer, NORAD 1979) makes two factors unmistakably clear: the human factor and time.
The result is therefore not a more robust deterrence posture, but a configuration that drastically reduces the chances of de‑escalation once a crisis is triggered. If human time is no longer sufficient, the system will seek technical shortcuts—with all the risks this entails. That said, it is absolutely necessary to emphasize that, as of today, AI operates in deterrence only as a computational system, with applications involving Machine Learning strictly excluded.
Implications for Extended Deterrence.
Fragility becomes even more evident in extended deterrence (NATO, Taiwan, regional alliances). Defending an ally with hypersonic weapons means asking decision‑makers to risk national annihilation within minutes, on the basis of incomplete information. In all simulated scenarios, the conditional probability of strategic nuclear escalation following first use remains high (approximately 70–85%), regardless of the theater. The robustness of this result lies in the convergence of scenarios, not in the point estimate.
Hypersonic delivery systems do not reduce this probability: they simply accelerate its temporal realization.
The Final Paradox: More Capability, Less Control.
The analysis converges on a central paradox: contemporary deterrence is technologically more capable but strategically less controllable. Hypersonic systems upgrade offensive capabilities without a corresponding upgrade of the decision architecture, which remains largely anchored to logics of the 1960s. In the absence of automatic de‑escalation mechanisms—such as time‑locks, multi‑node authorizations, and international circuit‑breakers—the introduction of these systems renders deterrence unsafe by design.
Mutual Erosion.
Hypersonic systems erode deterrence for Russia as well, because they strike at the logical core of Russian nuclear deterrence, not only the American one. This is not a paradox: it is a structural effect. The reason becomes evident when one considers that Russian deterrence depends on early warning and centralized decision‑making.
Russian doctrine is more rigid and more centralized than that of the United States.
A key fact:
– Russian decision time is shorter,
– the command chain is less redundant,
– the early‑warning system (radars + satellites) is more fragile than the American one.
This means that any weapon reducing predictability and decision minutes is more destabilizing for Moscow than for Washington.
It would be illusory to think that the United States will not soon close the technological gap on hypersonic missiles. The Dark Eagle is an example.
It is obvious that the U.S. will close the gap, but once their systems become operational, they will restore technological parity without leading to more stable deterrence. On the contrary, they will degrade it symmetrically, for the very reasons outlined above—and this future is as inevitable as it is unsettling.
Hypersonic delivery systems are not simply a new class of armaments. They represent a factor of systemic instability that compresses time, dissolves thresholds, amplifies human error, and transforms deterrence from a precarious equilibrium into a strategic risk factor. This is not a technological, moral, or ideological view, but an architectural one. They do not promise the inevitability of war, but make its avoidability increasingly unlikely. And in a system built on avoiding the irreversible, that difference is everything.
If nuclear deterrence has always been a pact with the devil, hypersonic systems embody its most dangerous clause: the one that eliminates the time to reconsider.
* Honorary Member of the Board of Directors and Lecturer at the Società di Studi Internazionali of Madrid (SEI). Lecturer, Master in International Relations, Universidad CEU Fernando III.
© Paolo Falconio – 2025
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