by Paolo Falconio * –
This article analyzes the transformation of Turkish foreign policy under President Erdoğan, focusing on the Mavi Vatan (“Blue Homeland”) doctrine as a central element of a neo-Ottoman geopolitical reassertion strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond.
The research examines how Turkey is pursuing a revisionist project of the regional order through a unilateral redefinition of Exclusive Economic Zones based on tectonic plate theory, in opposition to the conventional interpretation of UNCLOS. This approach, which privileges criteria of continental mass and population over insular territorial sovereignty, is framed within the broader context of a neo-imperial vision that selectively recovers Ottoman heritage and reinterprets it in maritime and energy terms.
The analysis is structured around five main strategic dimensions:
(1) the redefinition of maritime spaces and control of underwater energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean;
(2) politico-military penetration in Libya through the 2019 Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of National Accord;
(3) expansion in the Western Balkans, with particular reference to Albania as a bridgehead toward southeastern Europe;
(4) strategic positioning as an indispensable energy crossroads for the European Union;
(5) projection into sub-Saharan Africa and the Horn of Africa.
The study highlights how Turkey combines military, economic, diplomatic, and cultural instruments to build asymmetric but effective relationships, financially supported by strategic partnerships (Qatar) and legitimized domestically through a nationalist narrative of rediscovered power. Particular attention is devoted to the implications for Italy, which has progressively lost influence in areas traditionally considered of strategic national interest (Libya, Albania, migratory corridors).
The research concludes that Turkish foreign policy represents a paradigmatic case of a regional revisionist actor challenging the post-colonial and post-Cold War order, operating simultaneously within and against the structures of the Atlantic alliance. The absence of a coordinated strategic response from Europe, and Italy in particular, risks consolidating a new Mediterranean equilibrium in which Western interests are structurally marginalized. The urgent development of a coherent strategy is recommended that, while not necessarily confrontational, is founded on awareness of the ongoing geopolitical competition and assertive protection of national and European interests in critical theaters.
In the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey is assuming a role of growing political, energy, and military importance. The Memorandum of Understanding on the delimitation of Exclusive Economic Zones, signed on November 27, 2019, with the Libyan Government of National Accord, represents a fundamental step in President Erdoğan’s vision: a Turkey fully protagonist in its maritime dimension, as well as terrestrial.
This strategy is hinged on the Mavi Vatan doctrine, the “Blue Homeland,” developed by prominent figures in the Turkish Navy such as Admirals Cihat Yaycı and Cem Gürdeniz. It is a geopolitical conception that attributes to Turkey a broad zone of maritime influence and has implications well beyond the delimitation of territorial waters. Exclusive Economic Zones concern not only fishing: they define control over underwater energy resources, commercial routes, and strategic infrastructure.
The critical point is that the Turkish definition of the Blue Homeland does not follow the interpretation of UNCLOS adopted by Greece and much of the international community, but rather tectonic plate theory. Ankara contests that Greek islands—such as Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Kos, Rhodes, and especially Kastellorizo—can automatically generate their own full EEZ, significantly limiting Turkish maritime space, effectively “enclosing” Turkey in Anatolia. It is a vision that overturns the Westphalian principle of territorial sovereignty in favor of a criterion of maritime “living space” based on population, coastal extension, and continental mass. An approach that dangerously recalls other expansionist doctrines of the twentieth century: it eerily echoes Lebensraum logic, where the demographic and territorial dimension of a State justifies the claim to others’ spaces. Hence the tension: the neo-Ottoman vision tends to design a Mediterranean in which Turkey has a preeminent and essential role. In essence, this doctrine serves as an ideological and strategic framework for the construction of a Turkish maritime identity, filling a historical-cultural void that the Ottoman Empire had never truly filled, despite its Mediterranean extension. It becomes a pivot between law of the sea and will to power. The central theme is clear. We are not witnessing improvised tactical moves, but a coherent strategic project rooted in a precise ideological vision.
Despite being a NATO member, Ankara pursues a foreign policy that is often autonomous and sometimes in conflict with Alliance interests. The ideological roots of this posture also lie in Ahmet Davutoğlu’s thinking and his idea of a “global role” for Turkey: a return of the country’s influence in areas once belonging to the Ottoman Empire. This reference allows reading Erdoğan’s policy not as a set of isolated tactical moves, but as a coherent project of revival of Turkish influence in the territories and routes of the former Ottoman Empire, this time however reinterpreted in maritime and energy terms.
The main objectives of the Blue Homeland are three:
1. Increase influence over distribution plans for Levantine energy resources, particularly gas fields discovered in recent years.
2. Weaken the Greek-Cypriot axis, positioning itself as an indispensable actor for security and cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean.
3. Avoid exclusion from regional partnerships in the energy and infrastructure sector, making Ankara an obligatory passage for any decision regarding the area.
Turkey pursues these objectives by combining diplomacy, military pressure, naval presence, and asymmetric bilateral relations. The case of Libya is emblematic. With the signing of the memorandum, Ankara created a continuous maritime corridor with Tripoli and replaced Italy as the main reference power in the North African country. The agreement is a real qualitative leap: Ankara acquires a maritime corridor that alters the political geography of the Mediterranean and allows it to block any hostile energy infrastructure as well as cut out Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt from their infrastructure projects. The UN arms embargo on Libya has repeatedly recorded reports of violations by various actors, including Turkey itself, which gives a measure of the intensity of Turkish involvement.
The Turkish military and technical presence in Libya has not only strategic implications; the recent rapprochement with Benghazi (the Libya of Cyrenaica that opposes Tripolitania) risks definitively closing the maritime corridor and allows Ankara to think about getting its hands on the oil wells of Libyan Cyrenaica. A posture with direct consequences for Italy, not only in the energy field. Regardless of the recent rapprochement also with Haftar’s Cyrenaican Libya (the Turks are currently stable in Tripolitania), Rome has lost its “fourth shore” and, with it, part of its operational control capacity over migratory flows. The patrol boats donated by Italy to Tripoli now operate with Turkish instructors on board, within an expanded SAR area financed by Rome. In effect, a relevant segment of the departure control system is mediated by Ankara. The image of Italian patrol boats with Turkish instructors on board is truly the photograph of a strategic decline that goes beyond the specific case. Rome, in addition to having renounced the “fourth shore” without fighting, has outsourced migration control to an actor pursuing divergent interests, and continues to pay for a system it no longer controls. This raises a broader question about Italy’s ability to think strategically about the Mediterranean. While Turkey reasons in terms of centuries and imperial spaces reinterpreting them in modern terms, Italy seems to reason in terms of electoral cycles and contingent emergencies. Ultimately, Italy has lost projection capacity, geopolitical vision, and perhaps also awareness of what is at stake.
Turkish projection also extends to the Western Balkans, where Ankara exploits cultural and religious ties dating back to the Ottoman period. Here too, a sea, the Adriatic, becomes a cultural corridor (point of origin to reach the Gate of the East) and commercial route for terrestrial penetration. Particularly in Albania, Turkey is progressively replacing Italy as a strategic partner: from investments in the construction and banking sectors to arms supply and training of local armed forces. This multi-level penetration gives Ankara influence over two of the main migratory routes to Europe: the sea route from Libya and the land route through the Balkans. Ankara’s expansion in Albania, aided by Qatari finances, also poses problems regarding the predominance of Muslim communities over other minorities and a risk of radicalization with terrorism-related phenomena, which could also be reflected on Italian territory through the land migration route or through the line of division constituted precisely by the Adriatic. A sea that once again becomes, as in past centuries, a fault line and at the same time a bridge. But this time Italy is not Venice: it has neither the will nor the vision to control this liquid frontier. The risk—very concrete—is that Albania becomes a Turkish bridgehead toward southeastern Europe, with all that this entails in terms of control of flows (migratory, economic, but also potentially intelligence and influence). Beyond the risk of radicalization, perhaps even more worrying is the loss of Italian influence in an area that for centuries was under the sphere of influence first of Venice and then of Italy.
On the energy front, Turkey has transformed itself into a fundamental crossroads for gas directed toward the European Union, especially after the reduction of Russian supplies. Controlling energy corridors means having veto power over critical infrastructure. It means being able to slow down or block projects like EastMed, the gas pipeline that should connect Israel, Cyprus, and Greece to Italy, bypassing Turkey (opposition entirely benefiting TurkStream). It means, ultimately, being able to negotiate from positions of strength on any Mediterranean dossier. This translates into political negotiating power—and Ankara understood this long ago.
No less relevant is the growing Turkish presence in Africa. In little more than two decades, Turkey has gone from 12 to 44 embassies, with a commercial volume that has grown from 4.3 billion dollars in 2002 to 36.6 billion in 2024. Military bases, economic partnerships, and infrastructure investments are consolidating influence in strategic areas such as Somalia and Libya and generally in the Horn of Africa and parts of Central Africa, primarily in Sudan and the Sahel.
Finally, Turkey aspires to present itself as defender of the Umma, assuming assertive positions in Middle Eastern conflicts and in recent Syrian events. However, this posture puts it on a collision course with Egypt and Saudi Arabia and arouses growing concern in Israel, the only actor in the area capable of responding militarily immediately and with U.S. support. The return, albeit symbolic, of a neo-Ottoman agenda cannot but encounter resistance in the only country in the region that does not accept alterations of strategic balances to its disadvantage. Directly challenging Israel means entering a completely different dimension of conflict.
Finally, the analysis must include a reflection on the imperial vocation of the Turkish people. Despite an economic situation that is uncertain to say the least (the Turkish lira is weak, inflation is high, economic fundamentals are worrying), in Ankara elections are won with foreign policy, regardless of whether it’s Qatari money financing it. This is perhaps the most subtle point: Turkish foreign policy is not sustainable only with Turkish resources. It needs financial partnerships (Qatar) and tactical alliances. But this doesn’t make it less effective. On the contrary, it demonstrates a pragmatism lacking in many European chancelleries. Erdoğan has managed to build domestic consensus through a message of national pride, rediscovered power, and strategic autonomy. External projection serves as an identity glue.
In short, Turkish foreign policy is a mature and pragmatic foreign policy and should be taken extremely seriously. Turkey is no longer a peripheral actor, but a protagonist reshaping regional balances and interfering with global ones. My great respect for Turkish policy, while diverging from Italian interests, I hope makes it clear that geopolitical competition, however intense, must never descend into caricature of the adversary or propaganda of the monster at the gates.
Erdoğan’s Turkey has vision, has diversified instruments (military, economic, cultural, religious), has the will to use them, and has demonstrated the ability to obtain concrete results.
The West, and Italy in particular, often continues to treat Ankara as a somewhat eccentric NATO ally to be brought back to order with some formal reprimand. This is a strategic error. Turkey is redesigning Mediterranean and Middle Eastern balances, is building an area of influence that from Africa to the Balkans reaches as far as the Middle East, is challenging the post-colonial and post-Cold War order.
Ignoring this reality or minimizing it means condemning oneself to irrelevance. Italy, in particular, should urgently develop a coherent strategy toward Turkey: not necessarily one of frontal opposition, but at least one of awareness and protection of national interests in theaters where we compete directly: Libya, Albania, energy corridors.
Erdoğan’s Turkey is no longer Atatürk’s Turkey, secular and westernized. It is not even the Turkey of the Cold War, NATO bulwark against the Soviet Union. It is something different and new: an assertive regional power, with imperial memory, Mediterranean ambitions, and projection capacity. Underestimating it would be yet another European strategic error in an era when we can no longer afford strategic errors.
* Member of the Honorary Governing Council and lecturer at the Society of International Studies (SEI); SEI lecturer appointed at Ferdinand III CEU University.
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