By Paolo Falconio
The narrative suggesting that the United States is undergoing a phase of structural difficulty contains elements of truth, but it must be placed in a comparative perspective. American difficulties remain relative when measured against those of competing powers. The Venezuelan crisis has clearly shown that, when confronted with U.S. power projection, China and Russia proved essentially unable to influence events or exercise even minimal interdiction capacity. Washington today maintains a stable presence in Venezuela, coupled with direct pressure on Iran, while simultaneously continuing to patrol Chinese waters. This is a multi‑level, multi‑theatre operational capability with no equivalent. An observation that, on its own, should suffice to dismantle the idea of an empire in retreat: the United States retains a global presence that no other power can replicate.
However, the U.S. administration appears to have developed a crucial awareness: the ability to project power does not automatically translate into the ability to convert it into lasting political outcomes. There is a substantial difference between intervening and consolidating.
Recent history offers numerous examples of this asymmetry. In Syria, Russia secured concrete guarantees—such as the preservation of its military bases—despite the regime change. The Ukrainian conflict has opened a phase of prolonged instability for the entire European continent, showing that when a position cannot be consolidated, the systemic cost can be extremely high. The United States, for its part, has a long record of interventions that did not result in stable arrangements: Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya are emblematic cases of military success lacking true strategic closure. A structural difficulty in thinking about the “after”.
In this context, the approach adopted in Venezuela appears different. Accepting the permanence of the regime in exchange for a new relationship with Washington could—over the long term—produce the primary objective: a strategic realignment between Caracas and the United States.
Whether this “cynical” approach will prove more productive remains to be seen, but it is certainly less costly in operational and human terms.
Beyond the dominant narratives about the freedoms of the Iranian people, the Iran question can also be read through a different logic. Any potential U.S. intervention would not aim at the direct and immediate overthrow of the regime, but at intensifying its symbolic humiliation. The perception within Israeli‑American security circles is that internal revolts are fuelled not only by economic collapse, but above all by the sense of failure of the theocracy—unable to defend the country and humiliated during the twelve‑day war.
In this light, the Mossad’s public statement regarding its involvement in the protests can be understood not as evidence of direct control, but as a tool of psychological pressure and delegitimization. The objective would not be to topple the regime with a sudden blow, but to accelerate its internal erosion, forcing it to focus on the domestic front and favouring a change in the short term.
This is, therefore, a strategy that privileges political realism and perception over purely military logic. A form of systemic pressure rather than occupation, aimed at turning internal political weakness into a decisive factor. Obviously, the risk in the event of intervention is to obtain the opposite effect—the rally‑round‑the‑flag dynamic, whereby the population rallies around the regime in the face of an external enemy. But this is part of the intrinsic ambivalence of any external intervention.
In short, we may be witnessing an American paradigm shift, one more attentive to capitalizing on outcomes—even at the cost of appearing more cynical compared to the democratic dogma that characterized previous U.S. interventions. It will certainly be difficult to perform worse than in the past; nevertheless, the price could be a significant loss in terms of soft power and normative credibility.
* Miembro del Consejo Rector de Honor y conferenziere en la Sociedad de Estudios Internacionales (SEI)
